Is the Moon Jae-in Administration of South Korea giving up its Territory, Sovereignty, and National Security? The 2018 South Korea-North Korea Military Agreement Indicates as Such

2018-11-13, Tara O

The South Korea-North Korea military agreement was signed on September 19, 2018 between Song Young-moo, the then-Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and No Kwang-chol, Korean People’s Army General, Minister of People’s Armed Forces, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).  The agreement was signed with Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong-un standing behind them.   Here are the English version (17 pages) and the Korean version (56 pages) of the agreement.  The Korean language version has additional sections, such as “Forming a Bond of Sympathy with the Public…”  The difference in the lengths raises questions, and it is another topic to be analyzed in the future.  This report will analyze the contents of the English version of the agreement.

A.  Is South Korea giving up the military as an instrument of national policy?

The two sides agreed to…preclude the use of military force under any circumstance. [italics added]

Among the national instruments of policy are diplomacy, military, economy/finance, and information.  South Korean president Moon Jae-in is reducing options by excluding the military instrument, a powerful tool.  Paragraph 1.1 of the South Korea-North Korea military agreement signed in Pyongyang on September 19 states “The two sides agreed to…preclude the use of military force under any circumstance.”  Thus, no matter what, the two sides are not to use military force.  The Moon administration has touted this promise not to use military force as “peace,” but in reality, it takes away one of the key instruments of policy–the military.

The agreement does not state how that promise not to use the military force would be monitored, and what would happen if one side, in this case, North Korea, does not keep its promise.  In fact, the agreement takes away the capability to monitor military activity by preventing aerial surveillance along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) with greatly expanded No Fly Zones (NFZs).  By dismantling the defensive posture of the Republic of Korea and pulling its forces to the rear, it leaves the area to the north of Seoul vulnerable and significantly weakens and destroys South Korea’s ability to defend should North Korea attack.  The Moon administration already dismantled the Defense Security Command (which monitored North Korean infiltration and conducted investigations) and took away the  counter-intelligence function from the National Intelligence Service.  It is now pulling back its various units from the forward area.  How can South Korea detect North Korean infiltration in such a situation?

By designating large areas of the West Sea and East Sea “joint use” with North Korea, complete with a joint customs office, the Moon administration relinquishes its sovereign territory.  It also gives up some of its sovereignty by agreeing to give North Korea a say in matters, such as giving North Korea advanced notice before South Korean Navy ship can enter its own territorial waters and agreeing to get North Korea’s permission before South Korea can enhance its military capability.  Additionally, it risks South Korea’s economy by agreeing to sanctions-violating measures, such as South Korea developing roads and railroads in North Korea, which inevitably would require transfer of cash, equipment, and other resources to North Korea to build the infrastructure in North Korea.

Besides the substance of the agreement, the process of ratification of the agreement also became a controversy.  The National Assembly had not discussed nor ratified the military agreement (nor the Pyongyang Declaration); it was not even presented to the National Assembly.  President Moon Jae-in, after a cabinet meeting, ratified the agreement himself on October 23, 2018.  Perhaps he was in a hurry and wanted to ensure its “ratification.”  Paragraph 6 of the agreement states “This Agreement is effective from the date of exchange of the signed documents, following the procedures required for ratification from each party.”  There are criticism that this is against the constitution on many levels, which is a discussion for yet another paper.  The Blue House spokesperson then said North Korea is not a state, so there is no need to go through the National Assembly for ratification.  The Panmunjom Declaration, another agreement between the two countries, signed on April 27, 2018, however, is at the National Assembly currently going through the process of ratification.  

Clearly, there are inconsistencies.  The South Korean constitution does not recognize North Korea as a state, which raises the questions of why Moon is calling his meetings with Kim Jong-un “summits,” why he is signing anything with a “rogue element” Kim regime, and why the Panmunjom Declaration is going through the National Assembly for ratification.

The military agreement “can collapse the Republic of Korea itself…it’s a gift to Kim Jong-un,” said Lieutenant General Shin Won-shik (신원식), ROK Army Reserve, former ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. (1:25)  He further stated that the agreement fundamentally destroys the ROK’s defensive posture.   He makes an analogy with a human body.  (3:08)  He says the agreement first gives away the eyes–the ability to see and monitor North Korea.  It then gives away the arms and legs–the ability to respond to North Korea’s provocations.  With the heart, lungs, and other vital organs representing the 25 million people in and near Seoul, the next item to give away is what protects the organs–the ribs, which are akin to Northern Limit Line (NLL).  The military agreement is so dangerous to the very existence of the Republic of Korea that a group of 320 intellectuals called it void, and along with other reasons, called for president Moon to step down.

As defense experts and the opposition party have criticized the agreement as a humiliating surrender document that dismantles South Korea’s defense capabilities and gives away its territory, perhaps Moon was afraid it would not be ratified, and not quickly enough.  The agreement has numerous deadlines.   In reality however, the Moon administration began implementing parts of the agreement almost right away; some parts were implemented even prior to signing the agreement.

The Moon administration made no efforts to publicly discuss the items contained in the agreement or explain the implications to the people, other than to package it under the banner of “peace.”  For details of some of the military capability reducing measures that the Moon administration already has begun, see here for measures making Seoul vulnerable and here for removing the anti-tank barriers.

B.  Is South Korea relinquishing the control over its military?  Does South Korea (and even the U.S.) need to ask North Korea for permission for matters concerning South Korea’s defense?

In the agreement, it states “The two sides agreed to have consultations on matters including large-scale military exercises and military buildup aimed at each other, various forms of blockade, interdiction, and obstruction of navigation as well as reconnaissance activities against each other through the ‘Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee.”

1. Large-scale military exercises.  Large-scale military exercises include the annual U.S.-ROK combined exercises Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) and Key Resolve.  Does this mean that both South Korea and the U.S. must ask North Korea for permission to conduct exercises?
2. What does “military buildup” include?  It could include the forces and equipment arriving in/near South Korea for an exercise or for bolstering defense capability.  So does this mean that South Korea and the U.S. now must ask North Korea permission to send additional forces for exercises?  To deploy THAAD?  It also could include any future acquisitions.  Thus, any efforts to enhance the current capability would fall under this term “military buildup.”  If South Korea wanted to purchase arms, including classified systems, or build indigenous capability, must it divulge the information and ask North Korea for permission?
3. What does “various forms of blockade, interdiction, and obstruction of navigation” mean?  Does this apply to sanctions enforcement, such as blocking North Korean ships containing North Korean coal from entering South Korean ports?  If so, does South Korea need to ask North Korea for permission to block the North Korean coal shipments to South Korea in order for South Korea to meet its obligation to enforce sanctions?  Instead of North Korean coal, if the ship had North Korean special forces and weapons, does the same permission seeking apply?
4. Reconnaissance activities.  North Korea is offensively postured while South Korea and combined South Korea-U.S. military forces are defensively postured, so the main threat to peace comes from potential North Korean attack.  Given this reality, South Korean and the combined reconnaissance capabilities of both South Korea and the U.S. are crucial for monitoring North Korean forces.  It is South Korea-U.S. combined forces that has significant reconnaissance capability, not North Korea.  As an open society, South Korea also has more transparency.  It is odd to “consult” North Korea for reconnaissance activities.  In addition to “consultation,” the No Fly Zone also places additional restrictions on the reconnaissance activities.

Further, before taking any direct countermeasures to any North Korea’s provocative attacks, South Korea must go through a 5-step process on ground and sea and a 4-step process in the air.  The agreement states “To this end, the two sides agreed to apply a five-step procedure (Initial warning broadcast → Secondary warning broadcast→ Initial warning fire → Secondary warning fire → Military action) on ground and at sea, and a 4-step procedure (Warning radio & signal → Interdiction flight → Warning fire → Military action) in the air.”  Up until this agreement, and after the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, the countermeasure was to return fire multiple folds from where the attack came from.  While the South Korean military goes through the 5-step/4-step procedures, North Korea could continuously attack South Korea.  This means if there is another shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, North Korea could continue to attack while South Korea goes through the 5-step warning procedures, losing precious time.

Another item is that the navy ships or any armed ships cannot enter the “Maritime Peace Zone.”  For an exception, it is “subject to prior notification to and subsequent approval of the other side.”  Thus, a ROK Navy ship cannot enter its own territorial waters unless approved by North Korea. Even non-armed vessels require 48-hour advance notice to the other side before entering the same territorial waters.

C.  The No Fly Zones (NFZ)

Scheduled to take effect as of November 1, the agreement states “…No Fly Zones will be designated within 40 km from the MDL [Military Demarcation Line] in the East…and within 20 km from the MDL in the West.”  If this takes effect, then it will greatly disadvantage the combined ROK and U.S. reconnaissance capabilities.  The ROK and U.S. conduct frequent aerial surveillance to keep abreast of the movements of the North Korea’s military, which is offensively postured.  North Korea does not have the kind of aerial surveillance capability of the combined forces nor does it need them because the combined forces are defensively postured.

General Shin Won-shik makes reference to the Open Skies treaty in this respect.  The key concept behind The Treaty on Open Skies, signed by the U.S., Russia, and others is to “enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information through aerial imaging on military forces and activities of concern to them.”  Although South Korea and North Korea are not signatories to this treaty, the opposing sides that signed the Open Skies treaty clearly felt that aerial surveillance is key to understanding the situation and building confidence.  The establishment of NFZs reduces confidence, and thereby reduces security.

Additionally, the restrictions greatly affect combined forces training, especially in support of ground forces.  The agreement states “In the air, the two sides agreed to ban tactical live-fire drills involving fixed-wing aircraft, including the firing of air-to-ground guided weapons within the designated No Fly Zones in the eastern and western regions of the MDL.”  The live fire training cannot be done in built-up areas, but at designated ranges.  Some of these areas that now fall within the NFZ cannot be used anymore to train. Notice that the NFZ extends 40 km south from the MDL on the east, so it covers a greater area than in the west.  In the West, they didn’t have to extend it further because of the Seoul Metropolitan area, where such training is prohibited due to heavy urban build-up.  Terrain in the prohibited parts are different than the terrain further south.  For air power to support the ground forces, the training should be where the ground forces actually are located and where they expect to conduct operations should South Korea be attacked.

Given that Seoul is so much closer to the DMZ than Pyongyang, the NFZ leaves the Seoul metropolitan area much more vulnerable.

D.  West Sea / Northern Limit Line (NLL)

The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) initially stated that the Maritime Hostile Activities Cease Area (해상 적대행위 중단 구역) extends to 40 km each to the north and south of the MDL, so equally in both directions, for a total of 80 km.  However, that was not the case.  The agreement states the markers are islands in the West Sea, “north of Deokjeok-do (덕적도) and south of Cho-do (초도).” It turns out that the Area extends 40 km north and 95 km south of the westernmost part of the NLL (a continuation from the MDL going out to West Sea, the blue line on the map) for a total of 135 km.  MND initially said a working level official made a mistake and said “It is meaningless to compare buffer zones with each other on a specific line basis.”  This MND comment is rather curious, if not irresponsible, coming from an organization where clear definitions matter for the security of the country and its people.  On the East Sea, the agreement states “within the zone north of Sokcho and south of Tongcheon,” for a total of 80 km.

In this area (Maritime Hostile Activities Cease Area), live-fire and and maritime maneuver exercises are to cease.  This means the ROK Navy or the Marines cannot conduct live fire exercises in the area.  In fact, the agreement states “the two sides also agreed to install covers on the barrels of coastal artiller[y] and ship guns and close all gunports within the zones.”  However, as of November 6, North Korea still has not complied, as at least one important location threatening South Korea still has a gunport that is not covered.

There are 5 main islands in the West Sea.  From the westernmost side, they are Baekryeong-do (some call it PY-do), Daecheong-do, Socheong-do, Yeonpyeong-do (some call it YP-do), and Soyeonpyeong-do.  (Note: “do” is island)  Near Baekryeong-do was where the ROK Navy Corvette Cheonan was sunk by North Korean torpedo attack, breaking the ship in half and killing 46 sailors.  Yeonpyeong is the island that North Korea attacked with artillery, killing two Marines and two civilians.  Both occurred in 2010.  The Republic of Korea considers the area in the West Sea under the NLL as its sovereign territory.  

About half of the population on these islands are civilians and the other half are the Marines defending the islands.  By prohibiting the use of major military weapons, such as the K-9 (which was used during the Yeonpyong attacks), it leaves the island residents and the Marines isolated and vulnerable to North Korean attack.  In effect, they become hostages to North Korea.  The North Korean military has viewed the Baekryeong Island and Yeonpyeong Island as “daggers” aimed at north, (4:14) so this agreement helps North Korea, and enhances North Korea’s confidence at the expense of South Korea’s.

The agreement also discusses establishing a “maritime peace zone” with the specific boundary lines to be “confirmed through consultations at the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee.”

The agreement lists various rules for the “maritime peace zone.”

• Vessels from both sides must hoist the Korean Peninsula flag (900 mm x 600 mm).
  • Vessels from South Korea:  flag on the left of the mast
  • Vessels from North Korea:  flag on the right of the mast
• If a naval ship needs to enter the zone, it needs prior approval from the other side
• Entry and operations of vessels must be after a 48-hour notification to the other side
• The two sides decide on the number of vessels that can be in the zone
• The entry hours are 7 a.m.-6 p.m. April-September; 8 a.m.-5 p.m. October-March
• Any words/actions that may provoke the other side, including psychological warfare, is not allowed

These rules are intrusive and limit the sovereignty of South Korea.  Hoisting the same flag makes it difficult to identify friend from foe.  There is no mention of the enforcement of any of these rules.  Additionally, what does provocative words and actions mean?  Does it include K-pop songs, weather information, and news, which were also broadcasted through the loudspeakers at the DMZ prior to the removal of the loudspeakers?  In that case, that is severe suppression of freedom of speech.

The agreement also establishes a pilot joint fishing zone between Baekryong Island (백령도) and Jangsan-got (장산곳).  The vessels must submit a request 48 hours in advance with name of organization, name of the captain, crew list, vessel name, entry route, and date of operation.  Will theses names and details be provided to the other side?  North Korea has routinely kidnapped fishing crew and it would seem to be dangerous to provide North Korea with such details.

This area is to be unarmed.  Chinese vessels have been fishing in the area as well as other parts of South Korean waters.  When approached, these Chinese fishermen have become violent, wielding axe and other weapons, killing and injuring South Korean coast guard officers.  If there is to be no arms, then how will they deal with armed Chinese fishermen?  

The agreement does mention Inter-Korean Joint Patrol Teams to interdict illegal fishing vessels from third countries.  It also states that the teams follow each of their own superior authority’s command.  Are these patrols armed?   These patrol boats could be used to infiltrate North Korean Special Forces, especially with the area rendered defenseless and with no monitoring capability.

E.  Han River/Imjin River Estuary–Directly Opens Seoul to North Korea

The agreement also covers the joint use of the Han/Imjin River Estuary, stretching 70 km long.  The estuary leads to the Imin River to the north and the Han River to the South.  Seoul bisects the Han River.  Historically, the Mongols and China’s different dynasties have invaded Korea through the Han River Estuary.  On March 23, 1980 at 2:50 a.m., armed North Koreans infiltrated South Korea through the Han River.  They were stopped before they could go through the barbed wire fence by then-Private Hwang Jung-hae (황중해) and others who arrived at the scene quickly.  North Korea routinely conducts Han River-crossing military exercises.  Given historical precedent, North Korea’s past aggressive actions, and its continued practice of the necessary skills, disarming the Han River Estuary without a reduction in North Korea’s threat is dangerous.

The agreement also sets restrictive rules for the Han River Estuary.

• Notify the other side 1 day in advance with a list of personnel and vessel information
• Personnel and vessels will be inspected at checkpoints
• Hours of use are 7 a.m.-7 p.m. April-September; 8 a.m.-6 p.m. October-March
• No surveillance/reconnaissance equipment, explosives, other weapons, or live rounds
• No comments/actions that may provoke the other side
• No communicating from the vessels from the other side except to exchange navigational signals and avoid collision
• If vessels/individuals drift or in an emergency, cooperate under humanitarian principles
• Stay 100 m away from the other side’s boundary line

In order to establish this joint use of the estuary, the ROK MND tasked its think tank Korea Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA) to examine pulling back the ROK 2nd Marine Division (해병 제2사단) [and the ROK Army 7th Mechanized Infantry Corps (제7기동군단)] further south.  The 2nd Marine Division is the forefront division that defends the western part of the Seoul metropolitan area–80 km of border between Gimpo and Ganghwa Island.  Redeploying the 2nd Marine Division to the rear means removing South Korea’s major capability to deter and defend Seoul.  For further analysis on the redeployment of the 2nd Division and the 7th Corps, see its section below.

The agreement states a joint survey is to be done by December 2018.  The South Korea-North Korea joint inspection team already began survey of the estuary on November 5, 2018.  The equipment, hardware, and vessels for the survey “will be subject to mutual cooperation.” Most likely, this means South Korea paying for them, which raises the question of sanctions violation.

South Korea began dismantling the barbed wire fence along the Han River.  The 12.9 km of fence left in Goyang City, north of the Han River and west of Seoul, is to be removed by April 2019.  The 9.7 km of fence left in Gimpo City, south of the Han River and west of Seoul, is not scheduled for removal yet due to an ongoing lawsuit.  The Moon administration sees the fence removal as part of a “peaceful” joint use of the Han River.  It is also reviewing removing the weirs from the river, which could allow North Korean special forces to be able to advance all the way to Noryangjin and Mapo districts of Seoul easily and quickly.  (6:55)  Removing the fence in addition to North Korea’s use of the Han River Estuary could also make it much easier for North Korea to infiltrate Seoul through the Han River.

The agreement dealing with the West Sea, NLL, and the Han River Estuary in effect gives away South Korea’s sovereignty to North Korea, vitiates the ROK defense capability, and gives North Korea, including its special forces, a free reign to enter South Korea.

F.  Pulling back South Korean Marine’s 2nd Division (해병대 2사단) and Army’s 7th Mechanized Infantry Corps (제7기동군단)

When the Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported its defense plan to the National Assembly’s Defense Committee on July 24, 2018, it included plans to pull back forces from the forward area.  After a controversy erupted about whether such plan included key forces–the 2nd Marine Division (해병대 2사단) and Army’s 7th Mechanized infantry Corps (제7기동군단), which leaves the area surrounding Seoul vulnerable, the MND denied that these units were under consideration to be redeployed.

Since then, the MND commissioned KIDA to review exactly that– how to pull back the 2nd Marine Division and 7th Army Mechanized Infrantry Corps from the forward areas.  The 2nd Marine Division defends the Han River area, including Gimpo City, Gosong City, Gwanghwa Island, and the estuary.  The 2nd Marine Division’s mission is to protect the western part of Seoul by stopping North Korea’s Korea People’s Army (KPA) 4th Corps and 2nd Corps, just across the MDL as well as North Korea’s amphibious landings and infiltration.  The division is also a national strategic maneuver unit, responsible for amphibious landing operations across the Han River during a contingency on the Korean Peninsula.  The concept is for the 2nd Marine Division is to conduct amphibious landings in Hwanghae Province in North Korea, essentially tying KPA’s 4th Corps to its bases in Hwanghae as well as portions of KPA’s elite 2nd Corps.  (4:25)

The ROK Army 7th Mechanized Infantry Corps are deployed in forward areas, including the cities of Gapyeong, Cheorwon, Pocheon, Yangpyeong, and Hongcheon.  It is heavily mechanized (including K-1 tanks, K-2 tanks, etc.) with formidable fire power (K-9 Howitzer, M270 MLRS, etc.).  If there are any breakthrough exposing Seoul, the 7th Corps’ mechanized units quicky rush to defend the capital, especially against North Korea’s mechanized forces.  (3:54)   Without the tanks and armored vehicles of the 7th Corps, if they are redeployed to the rear, how can the oncoming North Korean tanks be stopped?  What would delay North Korea’s move to Seoul is South Korea’s anti-tank barriers, designed to buy about 48 hours.   However, the removal of anti-tank barriers has already been underway.  Seoul is only 30 km or so away from the MDL, so the North Korean tanks could reach Seoul in an hour or two, if not stopped.

Airpower could slow down North Korean tank advances, if there is enough advanced notice, which is made difficult with the restriction on surveillance by declaring No Fly Zones and preventing surveillance in the Han River Estuary.  Even if there were enough time to react, airpower could blunt, but probably not stop the tanks in time.  It takes engineers constructing earthworks and tank barriers, dug-in infantry, and artillery to effectively stop advancing armor.  With the anti-tank barriers removed and redeploying the 2nd Division and 7th Corps to the rear, the Moon administration’s “peace measures” open up South Korea for a tank-led invasion by North Korea.

F.  The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

The DMZ is the purview of the UN Command (UNC).  The Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953 established the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) to discuss any violations and to ensure adherence to the truce terms.  The UNC MAC has long monitored and supervised the Armistice as well as conducted investigations on Armistice violations in the DMZ area.  Yet the items in the September 19 military agreement covering the DMZ, including the JSA, is not signed by the UN Command, but by the military representatives of South Korea and North Korea.  Thus this appears to be an act to bypass the UN Command.

They began the mine clearing at the JSA and the Arrowhead in Cheorwon area on October 1, soon after signing the agreement, and have completed demining.  The agreement states “the site for the pilot joint remains recovery project is in between MDL Markers No. 0489 and 0497 in Cheolwon, Gangwon Province….All guard posts and obstacles…must be withdrawn.”

Cheorwon area is one of three main invasion routes from North Korea to South Korea.  North Korea is known to plan to penetrate the enemy’s (South Korea) area with armor and mobile infantry to quickly occupy South Korea within a week.  Not only are mines removed from the area, but the agreement calls for building a 12 meter-wide road through both sides of the MDL, making it ideal for North Korea to execute its plan.

The two Koreas agreed to not use weapons within 10 km of the MDL.  This prevents the ROK military from training in the forward area.  The further south from the DMZ (but north of Seoul), the more developed South Korea is.  Thus for these units to find and go somewhere else further to train extra burden on the units and reduces their readiness.  The ground forces training with the air support is further restrained by the No Fly Zone, which covers an even greater area.

Guard posts:  Initially, the same number–11 guard posts (GPs)–are to be removed from both sides by December 31, 2018.  However, North Korea has about 160 GPs (about 10,000 soldiers) while South Korea has about 60 GPs (about 1,800 soldiers).  After withdrawing 11 GPs on each side, compared to South Korea, North Korea would have even greater proportion of GPs (3 times) and personnel (6.3 times), an increase from 2.7 and 5.6 times, respectively.  It is unclear how this imbalance builds confidence, except on the north side.

Eventually, all the GPs, firearms, equipment, and personnel are to be withdrawn and the GPs destroyed.

G.  Joint Security Area (JSA) of the DMZ

Annex 2 covers the JSA in Panmunjom.  It states “South, North and UNC will remove all mines in the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom within 20 days, beginning on October 1, 2018.”  First, they did not use “South Korea” or the “Republic of Korea,” but just “South.”  This is in line with Moon Jae-in using “south side” or “southern piece” to refer to South Korea when he visited Pyongyang in September 2018. (0:30)  Additionally, it obligates the UNC–”UNC will”–as if the UNC is told.  Whether there was prior consultation with the UNC or not, it appears to reduce or take away the UNC’s authority over the JSA and the DMZ, which was established per the Armistice.

The agreement further states that “the three parties will withdraw guard posts, personnel and firearms within 5 days after the minesweeping is completed” in the JSA.  It then states “guard posts and guard duty personnel will be established.”   There are to be 35 unarmed personnel from each side. It was not clear if the “each” side means South Korea and North Korea only or South Korea, North Korea, and the UNC.  Reflecting on the gruesome “axe murder” incident on August 18, 1976, where North Korean soldiers murdered Captain Arthur Bonifas and First Lieutenant Mark Barrett, both of the U.S. Army, with an axe at the JSA, unarming the guards does not appear to be prudent.  North Korean guard posts were in the South Korean side of the MDL then too.

The agreement also states “A new Southern guard post will be installed at one end of the ‘Panmunjom Bridge’ in Northern Panmunjom; A new Northern guard post will be installed in the area near the entry checkpoint of Southern Panmunjom.”  “South and North Korean personnel will be on duty side-by-side.”

This exchanging of guard posts, which are to be newly built, seems to be a way to prevent defection, like the dramatic defection by a soldier crossing over to South Korea at the JSA in November 2017 as he was shot multiple times by North Korean forces.  Having North and South Korean guard posts on opposite sides of the JSA is the situation that existed prior to the axe murder incident, as shown in the 1976 map of JSA above.  In fact, the concern for the safety of South Korea/UN guards at a post on the northern side of the MDL played a big part leading up to the Panmunjom axe murders.  The growth of a tree in the JSA blocked the visibility of a UN guard post that was essentially alone and undefended.  As UN and ROK personnel tried to trim the tree, the North Korean Senior Lieutenant Park Chul ordered them to stop.  When the UN side continued to trim the tree, 20 more North Koreans arrived and bludgeoned Captain Bonifas and Lieutenant Barrett to death.  For a detailed account of what occurred and see how quickly the situation can become deadly, see here.

After the axe murder incident, the guard posts were shifted to their present day positions.  The swapping of guard posts appears to be either a failure to learn from or an opportunity to repeat the past.

Adding to the safety concern is that the tourists to the JSA are to be allowed across the MDL, although there are no armed guards; there would only be “Panmunjom Civil Police” (판문점 민사경찰) written in blue on his/her left arm.  The agreement did not indicate whether these civilian police would wear the same uniform or whether they are sent from South Korea or North Korea.  If they do wear the same uniform, it will not be easy to distinguish friend or foe, if the situation turns hostile.

Another concern is potential for sanctions violations.  The crossing of guards, visitors, and tourists also allows the opportunity for potential transfers (of cash, etc.) by individuals acting as couriers, with potential sanctions implications.  The construction and repairs are to go through the “Joint Administrative Body.”  It is highly likely South Korea will be the one providing the funds for building new guard posts on both sides of the MDL, which also raises the issue of sanctions violations.

H.  Inter-Korean Road and Railroad

Annex 3 states “A 12 m-wide road will be constructed between South and North Korea” and it “must be completed by December 31, 2018.  Moon Jae-in has mentioned building and connecting the road by the “year end” multiple times.  It is his and Kim Jong-un’s high priority project, as indicated by the deadline and the word “must.”  The road construction is mentioned within the topic of “Joint Remains Recovery Project within the DMZ,” as the remains recovery is a humanitarian issue.

Im Jong-seok, Moon’s Chief of Staff, went to great length, including releasing military secrets, to narrate a video to promote remains recovery at the DMZ.  The video was filmed when Im Jong-seok visited the Cheolwon area of the DMZ on October 18, 2018, flanked by the Minister of Defense, Minister of Unification, National Security Adviser, and the Chief of National Intelligence Service while wearing sunglasses–the “Sunglasses Scandal.”

Known to admire Kim Il-sung of North Korea, Im Jong-seok is the Chairman of the South-North Summit Preparatory Committee. The Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon is his assistant, the General Assistant Administrator of the Committee.  Regular committee members are National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong (정의용), Chief of Staff for Policy Jang Ha-sung (장하성), Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha (강경화), Defense Minister Song Young-moo (송영무) (replaced by Jeong Kyeong-doo on September 21, 2018), National Intelligence Service Chief Suh Hoon (서훈), and Government Policy Coordination Minister Hong Nam-ki (홍남기).  For more on Im Jong-seok’s background, see here.

Despite the talk of remains recovery in the video, the real reason appears to be to promote the connecting of the road between North Korea and South Korea.  North Korea is the one that is lacking in infrastructure, including roads and railroads.  The rail gauges are different in North and South Korea.   Thus, “connection” of the road and rail road means building them in North Korea first.  As with other projects, the expectation may be for South Korea to pay.   In fact, the Ministry of Unification alloted 352.6 billion won ($315 million) of its 2019 budget of 10.97 trillion won ($978 million) toward road and railroad building/connection between South and North Korea.  The transfer of money and resources to North Korea, of course, would violate sanctions.

Additionally, if the Moon administration really placed high priority on the soldiers who fought during the Korean War and the humanitarian nature of it, then they could have also called for the return of the estimated 500 live ROK Prisoners of War (POWs) still held in North Korea against their will, many of whom are in their 80s or 90s.  The Armistice Agreement of 1953 also calls for the repatriation of POWs and displaced persons, which North Korea still has not accomplished.

I.  Various Deadlines in the Military Agreement

• 2018-10-1:  Beginning on this date, “South, North and UNC will remove all mines in the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom within 20 days.”
• 2018-10-1 to 11-30:  “All mines and explosives within the site for the pilot joint remains recovery project are to be completely removed between October 1 and November 30, 2018.”
• 2018-11-1:  From this date, “the two sides agree to cease various military exercises aimed at each other along the MDL.”
• 2018-11-1:  Effective this date, “the two sides agree to designate No Fly Zones (NFZs) for all aircraft types above the MDL.”
• 2018-11-1:   From this date, “the two sides agree to implement the above revised procedures.”  The procedures refer to the new 5-step procedure before taking military action.
• 2018-12-31:  Complete the withdrawal of 11 guard posts, 3 from the eastern region, 3 from the midlands, and 5 from the western region, from each side of the MDL.
• 2018-12-31:  By this date,  “the construction of [the] road must be completed.”
• 2018-12-31:  By this date, the “field survey of the joint utilization zone [Han (Imjin) River Estuary] will be carried out jointly.”
• 2019-2-28:  By this date, “the two sides will complete the composition of the Joint Remains Recovery Team and notify each other.”
• 2019-4-1 to 10-31:  During this time, the “joint remains recovery operations at the pilot site will take place.”

Conclusion

The military agreement is a one-sided disarmament of South Korea, because South Korea is diligently reducing its defense capabilities, while North Korea’s military posture, including its forward based forces, has not changed.  While South Korea has implemented the covering of its artillery, North Korea left at least one gunport open.  It is North Korea that has conducted provocations in the West Sea, yet if it happens again, South Korea’s responses are hamstrung by the “5-step procedures.”  South Korea must ask North Korea permission for its Navy to enter its own territorial waters in the declared “peace zone” as well as to build-up its military capability.  The agreement essentially ignores the NLL, giving North Korea free reign to come across and access Seoul, Incheon, and other places in South Korea.  Giving North Korea access to the Han River is especially dangerous, as it is tantamount to giving access to Seoul.  Redeploying the 2nd ROK Marines (and 7th Army Mechanized Corps) to the rear especially renders Seoul vulnerable.  Removing these units, opening up the NLL, opening up the Han River, removing the mines in or near two of the invasion corridors (JSA, Cheolwon) are all dreams for North Korea’s invasion planners.

A crucial part of an agreement is to verify, which means the surveillance should actually be more active, but the agreement takes away or significantly degrades surveillance operations by restricting them.  It cannot build confidence, because North Korea’s actions, are difficult to verify.  It relies on blindly trusting North Korea, although North Korea has a track record of violating agreements, has not lowered its offensive capability, and has not changed its intentions.  The North Korean Kim family regime’s goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula under its rule is unchanged.  The agreement also calls for South Korea taking measures, including building and connecting roads and railroads, which violate sanctions against North Korea.

The 2018 military agreement gives away South Korea’s territory, sovereignty, and security.  Ultimately, this agreement places Koreans and foreigners in South Korea in greater danger from potential North Korean attack and coercion.  It also sets South Korea up to violate sanctions, which likely subjects South Korea itself to secondary sanctions.